Abstract-In this paper, we introduce a new threshold signature RSA-typed scheme. The proposed scheme has the characteristics of un-forgeable and robustness in random oracle model. Also, signature generation and verification is entirely non-interactive. In addition, the length of the entity signature participate is restricted by a steady times of the length of the RSA signature modulus. Also, the signing process of the proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of time complexity and interaction.
INTRODUCTION
Disclosure of a private key for non-cryptography purposes for example a compromise of the basic system, human mistake or insider attacks, is actually the highest threat to many cryptography schemes. The most generally suggested solution is distribution of the private key over multiple servers by secret sharing. For digital signature, the primitive we deal with in this paper is the main direction of this thought threshold signature scheme.
However, the interesting type of secret sharing scheme contains threshold scheme with a set of n participants. Their access structure contains all subgroup of t or more participants. Such schemes are called t out of n threshold schemes or just ) , ( n t schemes. Threshold scheme was independently presented by Shamir [1] . This scheme is relied on polynomial interpolation over a finite field. 
It is documented that Shamir scheme is perfect. That is, when a collection of fewer that t participants work together, their original doubt about K is not reduced. Suppose that any subset of r players out of R generate a signature, but reject the generation of a valid signature when less than r players involve in the scheme. This unforgeability characteristic must keep even when certain subgroup of fewer than r players are cheated and act mutually.
For a threshold scheme to be practical if certain players are cheated, it must also be strong, meaning that cheated players must not be capable to stop honest players from creating signature. In this paper, we will consider suggested scheme which face at least one of the following difficulties: To enhance this, we will introduce a new threshold RSAbased signature scheme which faces these difficulties. We will highlight that the signature outcome is an entirely invert RSA signature, meaning that the generation and verification algorithms are the same as for common RSA signature. But, there are certain limitations on the public key which should be a prime and the modulus should be the result of two strong prime numbers. The suggested scheme is easy to calculate, and has not previously suggested. However, preceding schemes of threshold signature have that 1
. This generalization is practical in situations where the honest players is not necessity choose what they are signing, but capable to verify that a big number of them have authorized a specific signature. In specific, threshold signatures with w R r   and 3 / R w  is used to decrease the lengths of the messages pass in coordinated network agreement scheme [1] . The use to coordinated network agreement was in fact the original purpose for this study. Almost all preceding work on threshold signatures supposes with a coordinated network, and any players in some way simultaneously agree to commence the signing scheme on a known document. Obviously, we cannot act in such a system when we desire to employ coordinated network agreement protocol.
We also highlight that the idea of a twin parameter threshold scheme gives robust security than one parameter threshold scheme; such scheme is actually more challenging to build and to discuss. The proposed idea of a twin parameter threshold scheme must not be confused with a vulnerable idea that from time to time seems in a threshold cryptosystem research [2] . For this vulnerable idea, there is a parameter w r  ' where the rebuilding algorithm needs ' r shares, but the security is lost when only one truthful player discloses a share. In proposed idea, no security is lost unless w r  truthful players disclose their shares. We work with a static cheating www.ijacsa.thesai.org system; the opponent should select which players to cheat at the start of the attack. This is in line with preceding studies into threshold signatures, which also suppose static cheating. The proposed system can be verified if 1   w r in the random oracle model using the RSA signature.
II. RELATED WORK
In 1989, Desmedt and Frankel [3] describe the difficulty with threshold signature scheme. This appear from the truth that polynomial interpolation by a coefficient ring
that n the RSA modulus and  is the Euler phi. Also, Desmedt and Frankel in 1991 [4] return again to the difficulty of threshold, and introduce a non-robust threshold scheme that is non-interactive but with small share length and without security discussion. Frankel and Desmedt in 1992 [5] introduce approach that providing a proof of security for a non-robust threshold scheme with small share length, but which needs coordinated interaction. Harn in 1994 [6] introduces a robust threshold scheme with small share length that also needs coordinated interaction. Gennaro et al. in 1996 [7] describe a robust threshold scheme with small share length, but again needs coordinated interaction. Actually, Gennaro et al. scheme can be examined with no reconstruction of random oracle. But this will have some practical disadvantages, demanding a particular relationship between the sender and receiver about the share of a signature. It appears that the security of these systems needs carefully examination by an acceptable approach. However, the above schemes are interactive and any threshold signature scheme relied on integer factoring seems inevitable to be interactive, because such signature schemes are randomized, and thus the signers have to create random values, which actually needs coordinated interaction.
But, in 1996 De Santis et al. [8] introduce a variant scheme that uses interaction for large share length. This scheme prevents the difficulties of polynomial interpolation over
is the th q polynomial taken ) ( mod n  , and q is a prime larger than l. This is suitable, as standard secret sharing method can be directly used, but guides to a more difficult scheme that need coordinated interaction. In 1998, Rabin [9] suggests a strictly robust threshold scheme that has small share length, but need coordinated interaction. This scheme takes a diverse line of the interpolation over ) (n Z  problem, avoiding it by presenting an additional layer of secret sharing and a lot more interaction. In 2006, Jun et al [10] described a non-interactive verifiable secret sharing scheme built by Shamir secret sharing scheme for secure multi-party communication scheme in distributed networks. In 2007, Li et al. [11] they introduce a secure threshold signature scheme without trusted dealer. In the meantime, the signature share generation and verification algorithms are non-interactive. In 2010 Gu, et al. [12] discuss the security of Jun et al. scheme and show that their scheme cannot withstand the misleading performance as they claimed.
III. SCHEME REQUIRMENTS There are three entities the player R , the dealer and an opponent. There are also a signature verification phase, a share verification phase and a share combination phase. In addition, there are two other variables, w represent number of cheated players; and r denote the number of signatures required to get a signature. The only restrictions are that 1   w r , and r w R   .
The opponent chooses a subset of w players to cheat. In the dealing phase, the dealer establishes a public key e and private key shares The opponent gets the private key shares of the cheated players and the public key and verification keys. Following the dealing phase, the opponent passes signing demand to the honest players for document of his choice. Upon such a demand, a player results a signature share for the known document. The signature verification phase obtains a document, a signature and the public key, then verifies whether the signature is valid or not. The signature share verification phase obtains a document, a signature share on that document from players i ,
, and verifies whether the signature share is valid or not.
IV.
THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme.
The dealer. The dealer must do the following: 
Finds
However, we can simply adjust a well-known interactive scheme of Chaum and Pedersen [13] . We collapse the scheme, making it non-interactive, by employing a hash function to generate the challenge such that a random oracle model is required. We also have to handle the actuality that we are using a group n D whose order is not known. So, this is unimportantly managed by just using adequately big integer. Suppose ) (n L is the bit-size of n . Assume that ' h is the hash function, whose result is 1 L bit integer, such that 1 L is a security parameter. To build the verification of correctness player x select a random 
